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I. 
Landscapes need spectators. Even when it is not pictured by a painter or photographer, the 
landscape is a picture of space that is seen from some distance and that is framed by the 
position and visual reach of the viewer. The space that is seen has not been entered though 
it is definitely a space that one might enter. 
Astrid Schwarz shows in her contribution to this volume what happens if one changes the 
angle and views a landscape from above by means of aerial photography. When we look 
horizontally into and beyond the scene, we see a lake in its natural setting. Here, the 
landscape organizes an interplay of multiple features and its aesthetic unity permits the 
viewer to question these relations. Seen from above, however, the lake becomes absorbed 
into a two-dimensional aerial map and reduced to a detail of a whole. Here the new media 
technology of aerial photography transforms the landscape into a map and turns the picture 
of a space into a flat arrangement of signs. 
One might also consider another transformation by another media technology. It constructs 
landscapes that transform the spectator into an actor. Here the landscape ceases to be the 
picture of a scene but becomes identified with a space for doing and building. It is no longer 
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an object of beauty or knowledge that is beheld by artists and geographers. The scene 
becomes a terrain that needs to be negotiated as one passes through it. Astrid Schwarz 
describes the move from landscape to map as a discontinuous change within the continuous 
movement of seeking higher and higher vantage points. Similarly, the profound 
transformation from spectator to actor, from pictured space to negotiated terrain results from 
a continuous development that started with attempts to render interior spaces visible by 
rendering them as landscapes. However, as cavernous spaces yield landscape views, the 
landscape becomes a cavernous space that beckons to be entered and explored. Indeed, one 
might trace this transition quite literally from techniques for the representation of the interior 
landscapes of caves to techniques of rendering representations as interactive caves.  
In 1654, Matthäus Merian produced what is probably the first published view of the interior 
of a cave.1  It appeared as part of a Topographia which catalogued characteristic views of «the 
most distinguished cities, castles, and other places and sites» in a politically defined region 
of Northern Germany.2 Merian’s prints typically provide scenes that situate the selected site 
at the horizon and within its natural setting, they are therefore paradigmatic for the visual 
conception of landscape as something that is seen from a vantage point that is removed just 
enough to show an entire scene of a site in its surroundings.3 For the depiction of the cave, 
a large hall is selected that affords the proper distance to a scene, and the scene 
itself resembles a somewhat amorphous mountain range with a valley stretching 
through. The vantage point of the spectator is dramatized by two figures in the 
foreground who illuminate the scene with their torches and indicate by their small size 
that the stone formations in the	cave is overtowering them. Merian’s cave is a subterranean 
                                            
1 Stephan Kempe et al.: Die beiden Merian-Texte von 1650 und 1654 zur Baumannshöhle und die dazugehörigen 
Abbildungen. In: Die Höhle 52(2), 2001, pp. 33–45; Stephan Kempe: The Baumann’s Cave at Rübeland/Harz, Germany, 
one of the Caves Noted in Early Science History for its Cave Bear and Cave Hyena Bone Deposits. In: Scienti c Annals, School 
of Geology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (AUTH) 98 (Special Volume), 2006, pp. 213–220.  
2 Matthaeus Merian (Ed.): Topographia und Eigentliche Beschreibung der Vornembsten Stäte, Schlösser auch anderer Plätze 
und Örter in denen Herzogthümern Braunschweig und Lüneburg, und denen dazu gehörenden Grafschafften und Landen. 
Frankfurt 1654, pp. 31–33, 63. 
3 Albrecht Koschorke: Die Geschichte des Horizonts. Frankfurt/M. 1990; Chunglin Kwa: Painting and Photographing 
Landscapes: Pictorial Conventions and Gestalts. In: Con gurations 16, 2008, pp. 57–75. 
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version of the world experienced above with its landscapes, ground and horizon and 
breathtaking views – and significantly, it does not have a ceiling. With the publication of this 
print coincided the beginning of tourism in caves, and ever since the mid 17th-century guided 
tours would lead visitors to vantage points from which to behold these subterranean 
landscapes. And also, since these times, the spectacular scenery in the great cavernous halls 
served as a stage quite literally for musical and theatrical events. The interior of the cave thus 
becomes staged as a landscape, and the landscape as scenery and stage serves to organize 
the tourist’s experience of the cave: The geological history of the Earth represents itself by 
way of a bizarre cast of stalagmitic characters that animate the scene (Fig. 1 & 2). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: From the cave to its representation: Merian’s view of the Baumannshöhle  
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Fig. 2: From the representations into the CAVE (Cave Automatic Virtual Environment)  
 
Leaping forward several hundred years to the end of the twentieth century, one encounters 
an inversion of this technique. In universities and science museums alike, the cave appears 
as a representational device and instrument of inquiry. By stepping into this artificial cave 
one steps, for example, into the interior of a cell. Equipped with a joy-stick for navigation, 
the investigators are surrounded on four walls, ceiling, and possibly even the floor by the 
various kind of molecular machinery. This is to enable them to see molecules as molecules 
«see» each other, and thus to experience viscerally the forces that draw molecules together 
or hold them apart. By becoming actors within their own simulations, they can feel the effects 
of their own interventions and acquire intimacy with the actions of the protein they wish to 
inject or with the tumor they are about to surgically remove.4 Here, representational 
                                            
4 See for example, Inge Hinterwaldner: ‹Actions of Interest› in Surgical Simulators. In: Bruno Latour et al. (Eds.): Making 
things public. Atmospheres of Democracy. Cambridge MA 2005, pp. 338-341; Colin Milburn: Atoms and Avatars: Virtual 
Worlds as Massively-Multiplayer Laboratories. In: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of 
Science 2:1, 2008, on the web at jps. library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations/article/viewArticle/4895 
(22.12.09); Inge Hinterwaldner et al. (Eds.): Topologien der Bilder. München 2008.  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capabilities are extended to create an environment in which the investigators are no longer 
spectators but explorers of the cave. Instead of watching the scene from a distance, they act 
on and in the scene, and accordingly the do not see a landscape but find themselves in the 
midst of the action.  
Between the cave as a landscape and representation of a space and the representation that 
constitutes a cavernous space of exploration, numerous media techniques explore a middle 
ground, namely that of inner space travel which leads the explorers to sublime views of 
interior landscapes and casts them also as actors in this scenery. There are cinematic 
adventures in subterranean worlds or in the inner space of the human body, such as Journey 
to the Center of the Earth or Fantastic Voyage. There are also video games that afford players 
the experience of being immersed in a half-familiar scenery as they navigate their fighter jets 
through narrow canyons. There are finally the nanotechnological surface-scapes created by 
scanning probe microscopy and its associated software that, often enough, is adapted from 
the topographic visualization tools of geographers.5 These surface-scapes open a space of 
deliberate technical action that did not exist prior to their visualization. They show that, 
indeed, there is plenty of room at the molecular level and that this space is largely 
uninhabited as yet. Topographically, these molecular landscapes are quite familiar, only the 
colors are off as they might be on another planet. And just like those on Mars they invite 
homo faber to come in and start shaping the world atom by atom.6  
When lakes become absorbed into the totality of a two-dimensional map and when the 
observers of nature become actors in their own plays, what has changed is how researchers 
behold their objects. In order to appreciate this change, it does not matter much whether a 
new manner of beholding research objects results from the changed media dispositif of new 
technologies,7 or whether new technologies and novel uses of old technologies answer to a 
                                            
5 Jochen Hennig: Bildpraxis: Visuelle Strategien in der frühen Nanotechnologie. Bielefeld 2010 (forthcoming).   
6 For an account of nanotechnological inner space travel and its relation to the slogan «Shaping the World Atom by Atom» 
see: Alfred Nordmann: Nanotechnology’s Worldview: New Space for Old Cosmologies. In: IEEE Technology and Society 
Magazine 23:4, 2004, pp. 48–54; also Astrid E. Schwarz: Shrinking the Ecological Footprint with Nanotechnoscience? In: 
Davis Baird et al. (Eds.): Discovering the Nanoscale. Amsterdam 2005, pp. 203–208.  
7 See for example, Jean-Louis Baudry: The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of Reality in Cinema. 
In: Philip Rosen (Ed.): Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader. New York 1986.  
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change of epistemic standards and expectations. What does matter is the collapse of distance 
that results from a gradual improvement of representational techniques and that signals the 
discontinuous end of science as a representational practice which aims for a theoretical 
description of the world. 
 
«Collapse of distance» refers to a change in the manner of beholding an object or of being 
related to the object, that is, of the dispositif that orients mind and body to the world. Since 
our orientation towards the world includes sensory as well cognitive modalities, an inquiry 
into the collapse of distance necessarily involves aesthetics and epistemology simultaneously. 
And this is where «landscape» came in – it refers to an aesthetic unity that arises with a 
certain manner of beholding sites and their surroundings, but it also refers to the 
epistemology of the scientific observer as spectator of a scene. The distance between the 
observer and what is observed resides in the fact that a landscape is the picture of a space in 
which the observer is absent. As soon as we move into the immersive, video-gaming space of 
the cave, its representational devices no longer require distance but serve to produce 
immediacy: The cave is not a scene to be watched from some distance, but a stage to be 
entered and explored.  
Another simultaneously aesthetic and epistemological category is «experiment.» If one 
conceives of experiments primarily as means to assess theories and hypotheses, this involves 
a particular cognitive and sensory orientation which once again casts researchers as distant 
observers of a scene. After setting the stage and building an experimental system, these 
researchers step back in order to convince themselves that they have nothing to do with what 
happens next: The experiment begins when things simply unfold and when some 
spontaneous effect can be observed on the stage that was meticulously constructed by the 
researchers. But one can conceive of experiments differently, namely in terms of dramatic 
events that harbor surprise and the challenge to control it. In this regard, the researchers do 
not observe the experiment from a safe distance but are deeply implicated in its performance. 
 7 
They participate in the experiment’s dynamics of suspense and revelation by demonstrating 
to their audience what they have learned to do and what effect they can achieve.8  
A third category appears to be primarily epistemological on first sight. However, the «model» 
is not just a tool for mediating between theory and reality but also a way of relating to the 
world and of beholding the objects, phenomena, and processes in the world.9 Here it is the 
advent of animal models and simulation modelling that signals a collapse of distance where 
the model no longer stands at a representational distance to reality but where it becomes a 
substitute reality by virtue of participation and similarity. It is here that the opposition of 
pictorial representation vs. immersion and participation in a cave-like situation can be 
discussed most generally, and where the collapse of distance serves most clearly to 
distinguish not only two ways of beholding but two ways of conducting research, one 
scientific, the other technoscientific. But this requires us to step back for a moment from 
landscapes and caves, different conceptions of experimentation and modelling, and to 
consider more generally scientific and technoscientific ways of conducting research.  
 
II. 
Peter Galison studies the work of physicists of which other physicists say that it is «no longer 
physics».10 In particular, he focuses on certain conceptions of string theory, nanotechnology, 
and simulation modelling. He is careful not to pass judgement on whether or not the 
contested work is, in fact, physics. He is equally careful not to rank this work as inferior, 
methodologically deficient or epistemologically naïve. Instead, he is interested to show what 
might be meant by the claim that something is «no longer physics.» He identifies the fault-
line of the debate as the question of ontological indifference: Is it the task of physics to 
ascertain first and foremost what is or isn’t the case, what the building blocks of matter are, 
                                            
8 To these different ways of conceiving scienti c experiments epistemologically and aesthetically correspond different ways 
of experimenting in the arts, see: Alfred Nordmann: Experiment Zukunft: Die Künste im Zeitalter der Technowissenschaften. 
In: subTexte 03: Künstlerische Forschung – Positionen und Perspektiven. Zürich 2009, pp. 8–22.  
9 Alfred Nordmann: ‹Getting the Causal Story Right›: Hermeneutic Moments in Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science. 
In: Stephan Hartmann et al. (Eds.): Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science. New York 2008, pp. 369–388.   
10 Peter Galison: The Pyramid and the Ring. Presentation at the conference of the Gesellschaft für analytische Philosophie 
(GAP). Berlin 2006.  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what is artefact and what reality, what a necessary feature of a conceptual model and what 
a measurable process? Certain approaches to string theory, nanotechnology, and simulation 
are indifferent to such questions. They care not about the existence of things but about their 
properties and functions and what to make of them.  
Where building takes the place that was formerly occupied by knowing, where «what works?» 
takes the place of «what is?» and where «how can we extend our capabilities?» takes the 
place of «how is the world hierarchically organized?» scientists are still involved in basic 
research. Even when physics goes beyond the purview of physics, classically conceived, this 
research does not directly lead to technical applications, it does not necessarily consist in 
scientists working on the creation of devices, and it does not always respond to societal 
demands or specific human needs. And yet, Galison accurately refers to an «engineering way 
of being in science». To put the point more generally, ontologically indifferent 
technoscientific research is not about the true description of the world and not about the 
functioning of devices but consists in the acquisition and demonstration of basic 
capabilities.11 In particular, these are basic capabilities of visualization and manipulation as 
embodied in the scanning tunnelling microscope as an icon of nanotechnology.12  
Even though basic technoscientific research need not be application-driven, it is research in 
a context of application. It can afford ontological indifference only to the extent that it can 
rely on the fact that its objects of research as well as its modelling tools belong to a world 
that is already the product of science and technology. Ontologically indifferent research is 
parasitic on the pervasive technical implementation of the knowledge produced in the 19th 
and 20th centuries. In a somewhat loose manner of speaking, technoscientific research takes 
place in the medium of science and technology. In this medium, there is no linearity of 
application from one domain – namely, scientific theory – to another domain, namely 
technical capability. Instead, what is applied is science and science-based technology as a 
whole and what is applied are the scientists themselves: A large repertoire of theoretical 
resources, of laboratory skills, of modelling techniques, of black-boxed instruments, of 
                                            
11 Alfred Nordmann: Philosophy of Nanotechnoscience. In: Günther Schmid et al. (Eds.): Nanotechnology. Vol. 1. Günther 
Schmid (Ed.): Principles and Fundamentals. Weinheim 2008, pp. 217–244. 
12 Davis Baird et al.: Probing the History of Scanning Tunneling Microscopy. In: Davis Baird et al. (Eds.): Discovering the 
Nanoscale. Amsterdam 2004, pp. 145–156.  
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interdisciplinary collaborations is applied to the production, explanation, control of novel 
phenomena. These phenomena in turn, and thus the objects of research inhabit the 
knowledge society, they require for their existence the contemporary technologized world 
and are not eternal inhabitants of nature that are only now brought to the light of day.13  
 
All this suggests that technoscientific research takes place within a self-contained world or 
second nature which in the form of scientific knowledge, technical instruments and practices 
takes up or absorbs much of the «natural world» or first nature. By the same token, the 
relation between these worlds becomes opaque and thus the relation between the 
technoscientific presentation of effects to the phenomena in the «real world out there.» In 
other words, where ontologically vigilant science tends to the gap between the sphere of 
representation and the sphere of what is to be represented, there is no such gap for 
ontologically indifferent technoscience: It moves laterally between practices of production, 
construction, visualization, modelling and assumes that these practices lead to the discovery 
and control of dynamic processes that obtain in the «world out there» just as much as they 
do in the technoscientific context of application, if only because the latter partakes in the 
former.14  
This is not the place to fully elaborate, let alone justify all these claims about technoscience. 
In particular, it cannot be argued here whether and to what extent technoscience is 
something novel. Also, it cannot be shown why and how technoscience can afford to be 
ontologically indifferent. Instead, a particular aspect is to be singled out: How do scientists 
behold their objects in ontologically vigilant science and within the engineering way of being 
in science? How does a manner of beholding constitute the scientist along with the object as 
an object of scientific experience? Or inversely, what kind of attitude towards the object is 
implied by research interactions, how does the object appear in scientific experience?  
 
                                            
13 Here, the philosophy of technoscience links up with sociological accounts of a «re exive» second modernity (Ulrich Beck 
et al.).  
14 For this and much of the following see Alfred Nordmann: Collapse of distance: Epistemic Strategies of Science and 
Technoscience. In: Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 41, Kopenhagen 2006, pp.7–34.  
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A very schematic history might distinguish several stages but the focus here is even more 
schematically on just two. These stages are distinguished by the representational practice of 
modern science as an artful construction of immediacy and by characterizing the immersive 
practice of technoscience as a symbolic substitution of a dynamic system of nature by a 
technologically constructed dynamic system.  
The artfully artless construction of a scene is characteristic for the laboratory of modern 
science where an experiment is set up to enable the exhibition of nature. It is underwritten 
by a dispositional account: The phenomena of nature were always there, lying ready to 
manifest themselves when prompted. Laboratory technology and the experiment finally 
provide that prompt for the phenomenon to show itself. Here, the experimenters can 
maintain a clear conceptual distinction between what they have done and what nature does; 
they can transition from their role as prompters who actively set the stage to that of witnesses 
or spectators. The phenomena can speak to them as if on their own accord, the simplified 
laboratory constructions appear as if they were unadulterated nature, the models of reality 
are taken as if they were reality itself. Such «as if»s need to be artfully maintained; the 
necessary distinctions require a work of purification that typically consists in distinguishing 
experimental artefacts from meaningful measurements, controlling variables, or finding out 
what in our conceptualizations belongs to nature and what belongs to the apparatus required 
for picturing nature. Scientists as masters of the «as if» thus solve a problem of representation: 
Well aware that the representation and what is represented cannot be immediately compared 
but are separated by an abyss of «aboutness», they create conditions under which nature 
appears to spontaneously and immediately agree or disagree with its representation: The gap 
between a mental construct here and a physical event there can be closed when the event 
yields a measurement or confirms a prediction.15 The very difficulty of producing a true 
representation of the world thus prompted a variety of artful constructions of immediacy, 
that is, methodologically crafted institutions that let nature speak as if untutored. Ontological 
vigilance is just another word for an awareness of these difficulties.  
It is the progress of representational techniques that prepared the shift from representation 
to symbolic substitution. Technoscientific representations are so good, that is, so saturated 
                                            
15 The foregoing characterization relies on various case-studies and amalgamates much Science Studies scholarship. For at 
least some more detail see the paper referenced in note 14.  
 11 
with reality, that they stand in for reality itself rather than refer to a reality «out there». So, 
here we encounter again the collapse of distance that comes with the neglect of the 
aboutness-relation between the representation and what is represented. This is not to say 
that technoscientific visualizations and models are not meant to refer to a reality beyond 
themselves. Instead, this is to claim only that their relation to an external reality is for the 
most part taken for granted, that its details often remain opaque, and that it requires a special 
and highly specialized effort to recover the representational qualities of these models. The 
unquestioned assumption of an opaque representational quality is another word for 
ontological indifference.  
 
Two examples make that point. Medical and pharmaceutical research frequently relies on so-
called animal-models of disease. Sometimes these animal-models are genetically engineered 
like the infamous cancer-mouse.16 The animal offers a living substitute for a human breast-
cancer patient. Researchers can spend their entire careers studying the animal model without 
asking how the model represents human cancer and without transitioning from the animal 
model to a human patient. As they watch tumors grow and shrink, they cannot resort to a 
dispositional account that permits them to separate the work of technology and the work of 
nature: It is not the case that experimental interventions prompt the manifestation of natural 
phenomena. After all, the dispositions of the cancer-mouse, and foremost its disposition to 
get cancer, are themselves a product of engineering for the purposes of experiment. And what 
is engineered is not a single experimental artefact but a population of genetically identical 
mice, and thus a whole second nature with its laboratory ecology. This second nature is 
thought to partake in the world of the cancer patient. The use of the animal model is justified 
in general terms by the straightforward idea that the disease process in the cancer mouse 
shares in the dynamics of breast-cancer growth more generally. Since the animal model and 
the human cancer victim are thought to participate in the same dynamic process of tumor 
growth, it should be possible one day to transfer what one has learned about the animal 
model to the human patient. In the meantime, research is totally immersed in the substitute 
reality. While this substitute reality is heavily invested with features of the intended reality-
                                            
16 Again, the following is informed by numerous accounts, rst and foremost the one in Donna Haraway’s 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium. New York 1997.  
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of-interest, it is a formidable task to recover just how, precisely, this substitute reality serves 
as a representation of the reality-of-interest. And since researchers are working to heal 
human cancer by healing cancer in mice, this formidable task would undermine this 
confidence of purpose – suddenly, the animal model would appear as a model of a state of 
affairs other than itself.  
The second example contrasts the ball-and-stick models of molecular structure of the 19th 
century with the animated and interactive 3-D molecular imaging software of today. It is 
hard to overlook the discrepancy between model and reality when the model itself is crudely 
constructed to aid human imagination. Indeed, the early models wore their constructedness 
so openly on their sleeves and were so clearly expressive of a conceptual or explanatory 
structure that their users generally subscribed to positivist vigilance17: «since all we know are 
the models of our constructions, we know nothing of reality». In contrast, users of immersive 
and interactive software enter the cavernous world of molecules, analyze structures, discover 
potential bonding sites and thus afford their ontological indifference: «these models are so 
saturated with reality that all we need not to learn about reality can be learned right here.»  
In both examples, representation has given way to symbolic substitution. At the same time, 
the artful construction of a scene in which the constructed phenomenon can appear as the 
artless manifestation of nature gives way to immersion in a substitute reality of dynamic 
processes that are thought to participate in the dynamics of the natural as well as socio-
technical world. Representation requires that the careful opposition of the sign and signified, 
of knower and known yet permits an agreement between the two. The improvement of 
representational instruments and techniques produced a collapse of these oppositions. They 
allow for the incorporation into a substitute reality of the subject and the object of research 
as they are entangled with one another by way of the socio-technical world of which they are 
both participants.  
 
To be sure, this tentative diagnosis only sets the stage for a research agenda into this kind of 
incorporation, how it comes about and what it means. So, like some of the other essays in 
this collection of momentary analyses, this one concludes with research questions rather than 
                                            
17 Christoph Meinel: Molecules and Croquet Balls. In: Soraya de Chadarevian et al. (Eds.): Models: The Third Dimension of 
Science. Stanford 2004, pp. 242–275.  
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answers. Epistemologically, for example, one needs to ask about inferences from similarity 
when observations of the substitute reality (e.g., simulation experiments) are taken as the 
basis for judgements about «real-world» phenomena. Since what we see in the calculated 
picture looks like the picture obtained from empirical data, we conclude that the empirical 
data are due to a similar dynamic process as the one modelled in the simulation. 
Traditionally, such arguments from similarity have been considered highly suspect, but might 
they be warranted where the substitute reality is constructed from the tool box of successful 
theories and algorithms and centuries of accumulated scientific and technical knowledge?  
 
There are further questions, some concerning the philosophy of technology and the demand 
for transparency and control: Does the opacity of immersive and interactive rather than 
representational relations leave us with a magical sense of wonder how well things can work 
when the world is on their side, when they participate properly in its dynamic structure? 
Then there are many questions regarding the way in which the incorporation of the subjects 
and objects of research into a substitute reality is supposed to work: Does it rest on the 
supposition that all one needs are algorithms which express functional relations between 
properties and traits, and that these then allow us to move with ease between an insubstantial 
«natural« world and the symbolic substitutes that can fully absorb us? And in an essay on 
epistemological as well as aesthetic dimensions of research, there must also be aesthetic 
considerations. The artful «as if» of the modern scientists can be described as a proper balance 
between absorption and theatricality.18 It involves the construction of a vantage point from 
which scientists can be transfixed by the constructed scene in the laboratory, but transfixed 
in such a way that they do not appear as actors on their own stage. This is the view from 
nowhere, the gaze of objectivity. How is this view from nowhere transformed by the 
immersive and interactive experience of scientists who step into cavernous worlds and seem 
to move within and among them? And how is objectivity transformed when the objects of 
research become invested with social meaning and physical dynamics as is the case, for 
example, with the cancer-mouse? When research-objects become animated, literally and 
figuratively through animationtechniques, do they become research subjects and does it 
                                            
18 Michael Fried: Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot. Berkeley 1980.  
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require a critical media theory to restore their representational meaning and thus their 
objectivity?  
Perhaps, the artful apprehension of the landscape is a modern achievement that relates the 
observant and critical subject to a civilized and acculturated nature. The opposition of 
subjects and objects of research testifies to their interdependence, perhaps mutual 
constitution. Along Kantian lines one might say that by setting the stage on which nature can 
be observed, scientists cast themselves as sovereign lawgivers of a lawful nature. In contrast, 
technoscientists submit themselves to nature and its endless play of similarities by seeking to 
control it from within. As the notions of similarity and submission, immersion and 
substitution, simulation and participation suggest, technoscientists might just be pre-modern 
shamans and tinkerers in a world that is shaped by modern science and technology. By 
choosing to return into the cave19, they question what the landscape once taught us about 
distance and respect, about representation and truth, about limits of knowledge and control.  
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Baird, Davis and Ashley Shew: Probing the History of Scanning Tunneling Microscopy. In: 
Davis Baird, Alfred Nordmann, Joachim Schummer (Eds.): Discovering the 
Nanoscale. Amsterdam 2004, pp. 145–156.  
Baudry, Jean-Louis: The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of 
Reality in Cinema. In: Philip Rosen (Ed.): Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film 
Theory Reader. New York 1986.  
Fried, Michael: Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot. 
Berkeley 1980.  
                                            
19 With surprising eloquence, the Wikipedia entry on the «Cave Automatic Virtual Environment» notes that «The name is 
also a reference to the allegory of the Cave in Plato‘s Republic where a philosopher contemplates perception, reality and 
illusion» (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cave_Automatic_Virtual_Environment&oldid=327636238; 23.12.09). Of course, the 
return to Plato’s cave is the return to a prison of sorts, and what imprisons the inhabitants is ignorance about the nature of 
representation – they assume that the pictures on the walls give them immediate access to reality.  
 15 
Galison, Peter: The Pyramid and the Ring. Presentation at the conference of the Gesellschaft 
für analytische Philosophie (GAP). Berlin 2006.  
Haraway, Donna: Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium. New York 1997. Hennig, Jochen: 
Bildpraxis: Visuelle Strategien in der frühen Nanotechnologie. Bielefeld 2010 
(forthcoming). 	
Hinterwaldner, Inge: ‹Actions of Interest› in Surgical Simulators. In: Bruno Latour & Peter 
Weibel (Eds.): Making things public. Atmospheres of Democracy. Cambridge MA 
2005, pp. 338–341. 	
– and Carsten Juwig, Tanja Klemm & Roland Meyer (Eds.): Topologien der Bilder. München 
2008. 	
Kempe, Stephan: The Baumann’s Cave at Rübeland/Harz, Germany, one of the Caves Noted 
in Early Science History for its Cave Bear and Cave Hyena Bone Deposits. In: 
Scientic Annals, School of Geology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (AUTH) 98 
(Special Volume), 2006, pp. 213–220.  
– and Fritz Reinboth: Die beiden Merian-Texte von 1650 und 1654 zur Baumannshöhle und 
die dazugehörigen Abbildungen. In: Die Höhle 52(2), 2001, pp. 33–45.  
Koschorke, Albrecht: Die Geschichte des Horizonts. Frankfurt/M. 1990. Kwa, Chunglin: 
Painting and Photographing Landscapes: Pictorial Conventions and Gestalts. 
In: Congurations 16, 2008, pp. 57–75.  
Meinel, Christoph: Molecules and Croquet Balls. In: Soraya de Chadarevian and Nick 
Hopwood (Eds.): Models: The Third Dimension of Science. Stanford 2004, pp. 
242–275. 	
Merian, Matthaeus (Ed.): Topographia und Eigentliche Beschreibung der Vornembsten Stäte, 
Schlösser auch anderer Plätze und Örter in denen Herzogthümern Braunschweig 
und Lüneburg, und denen dazu gehörenden Grafschafften und Landen. Frankfurt 
1654. 	
Milburn, Colin: Atoms and Avatars: Virtual Worlds as Massively Multiplayer Laboratories. In: 
Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 2:1, 
2008, on the web at  
 jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations/article/viewArticl
e/4895 (22.12.09).  
Nordmann, Alfred: Collapse of distance: Epistemic Strategies of Science and Technoscience. 
In: Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 41, Kopenhagen 2006, pp. 7–34.  
– : Experiment Zukunft: Die Künste im Zeitalter der Technowissenschaften. In: subTexte 03: 
Künstlerische Forschung – Positionen und Perspektiven. Zürich 2009, pp. 8–22.  
– : ‹Getting the Causal Story Right›: Hermeneutic Moments in Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy 
of Science. In: Stephan Hartmann, Carl Hoefer, & Luc Bovens (Eds.): Nancy 
Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science. New York 2008, pp. 369–388.  
 16 
– : Nanotechnology’s Worldview: New Space for Old Cosmologies. In: IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine 23:4, 2004, pp. 48–54.  
– : Philosophy of Nanotechnoscience. In: Günther Schmid, H. Krug, R. Waser, V. Vogel, H. 
Fuchs, M. Grätzel, K. Kalyanasundaram & L. Chi (Eds.): Nanotechnology. Vol. 
1. Günther Schmid (Ed.): Principles and Fundamentals. Weinheim 2008, pp. 
217–244.  
Schwarz, Astrid E.: Shrinking the Ecological Footprint with Nanotechnoscience? In: Davis 
Baird, Alfred Nordmann, and Joachim Schummer (Eds.): Discovering the 
Nanoscale. Amsterdam 2005, pp. 203–208.  
inkido.indiana.edu/a100/handouts/Image116.gif (23.12.09). 
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cave_Automatic_Virtual_Environment&
oldid=327636238 (23.12.09)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
